Was kant right? Discuss

[slop slinger]

no shit, thats why i made the post

So what points do you disagree with him on?

[Honest]

So what points do you disagree with him on?

analytic synthetic distinction

[slop slinger]

analytic synthetic distinction

Whats wrong about it

[Honest]

Whats wrong about it

the veracity of so-called a priori statements can only be determined by comparing the statement to an ever-shifting web of definitions. for example, kant's example of "all bachelors are unmarried" was once an untrue statement. the statement "pluto is a planet" was a so-called a priori true before 2006, but untrue after. quine, in his two dogmas of empiricism, states that bachelor could also refer to a bachelor of the arts etc. and so only a posteriori context determines the veracity of a statement


however, kant also uses a priori to mean something like inherent features of the mind, so, even if we deny a clear distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, not all is lost. 

also, it's come to my attention that a large number of scholastic works have been published by kant-detractors, who critique the critique as being without value, dead, riddled with errors etc. which has sparked a contrarian urge in me to find the good in it; which will be a chore, seeing as his work is dry, obscure, opposed to all ordinary notions, and moreover long-winded

[slop slinger]

the veracity of so-called a priori statements can only be determined by comparing the statement to an ever-shifting web of definitions. for example, kant's example of "all bachelors are unmarried" was once an untrue statement. the statement "pluto is a planet" was a so-called a priori true before 2006, but untrue after. quine, in his two dogmas of empiricism, states that bachelor could also refer to a bachelor of the arts etc. and so only a posteriori context determines the veracity of a statement


however, kant also uses a priori to mean something like inherent features of the mind, so, even if we deny a clear distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, not all is lost. 

On a certain level I agree every a priori statement is altered in context instead of existing above that context. But also the call to radically contextualize all a priori statements is itself an a priori statement. It is just a better a priori statement than all the ones Kant came up with. 

Also are you suggesting it is not inappropriate to suggest there are a priori features of the mind? In any case, I think again that Kant just posits the wrong inherent features of the mind. He says time and space are a priori assumptions that must be made of the mind in order to understand how it engages with reality.  But I think time and space are themselves constituted in that engagement in the manner already described. Which on one level seems to be denying any inherent feature of the mind, but on another suggests a certain manner of experience is an inherent feature of the mind. This kind of critique is a running theme in that literature you mention.

[Honest]

But also the call to radically contextualize all a priori statements is itself an a priori statement. It is just a better a priori statement than all the ones Kant came up with. 

I disagree, seeing as "the call to radically contextualize all a priori statements " is subject to the same rules which nullify it as a priori. so there is no, "aha! but you're nullifying it a priori", because, again, the veracity of every statement depends on an a posteriori comparison with a shifting web of definitions

Also are you suggesting it is not inappropriate to suggest there are a priori features of the mind? 

quite the opposite. i disagree with kant's distinction between a priori and a posteriori with regards to things like bachelors, but his use of "a priori" to describe inherent features of the mind seems promising

[slop slinger]

I disagree, seeing as "the call to radically contextualize all a priori statements " is subject to the same rules which nullify it as a priori. so there is no, "aha! but you're nullifying it a priori", because, again, the veracity of every statement depends on an a posteriori comparison with a shifting web of definitions

Begs the question

[Honest]

Begs the question

'begging the question' is not applicable to the argument you've replied to, as its premise does not assume its conclusion:

premise:

• "the call to radically contextualize all a priori statements" is subject to the same critique it proposes: that no statement can be validated a priori
  

reasoning:

• if the veracity of every statement depends on an a posteriori comparison with a shifting web of definitions, then the critique itself must be evaluated empirically and contextually, not accepted as an a priori truth
  
• therefore, no contradiction or hypocrisy in critiquing a priori knowledge, as the critique itself adheres to the same principle
  

conclusion:

• the critique of a priori knowledge holds, as it consistently applies the same standard of contextual and empirical validation to all statements, including itself
  

it's basic logic to assume that, if all statements require empirical verification, then this requirement must also apply to itself; this is a self-referential critique, demonstrating logical consistency. it is not circular, but is rather a challenge to, and vindication of, its internal logic.

[slop slinger]

'begging the question' is not applicable to the argument you've replied to, as its premise does not assume its conclusion:

premise:

• "the call to radically contextualize all a priori statements" is subject to the same critique it proposes: that no statement can be validated a priori
  

reasoning:

• if the veracity of every statement depends on an a posteriori comparison with a shifting web of definitions, then the critique itself must be evaluated empirically and contextually, not accepted as an a priori truth
  
• therefore, no contradiction or hypocrisy in critiquing a priori knowledge, as the critique itself adheres to the same principle
  

conclusion:

• the critique of a priori knowledge holds, as it consistently applies the same standard of contextual and empirical validation to all statements, including itself
  

it's basic logic to assume that, if all statements require empirical verification, then this requirement must also apply to itself; this is a self-referential critique, demonstrating logical consistency. it is not circular, but is rather a challenge to, and vindication of, its internal logic.

The reasoning: "if the veracity of every statement depends on an a posteriori comparison with a shifting web of definitions" 
But it doesn't.  That's exactly the claim I am contesting and you can't assume it as already true in your reasoning. It should be your conclusion not your reasoning. That is begging the question.  You have no provided no additional argumentation for why your ostensible anti-a-priori statement is not necessarily itself a meta-a-priori statement.

[Honest]

The reasoning: "if the veracity of every statement depends on an a posteriori comparison with a shifting web of definitions" 
But it doesn't.  That's exactly the claim I am contesting and you can't assume it as already true in your reasoning. It should be your conclusion not your reasoning. That is begging the question.  You have no provided no additional argumentation for why your ostensible anti-a-priori statement is not necessarily itself a meta-a-priori statement.

the section you replied to was a demonstration of self-referential consistency, rather than an attempt to prove that all statements are a posteriori, and so it was inappropriate to claim that it "begs the question"


anyway...

as you remain sceptical, i feel that my chances of convincing you (that all statements are a posteriori, or, to remove the distinction between a priori and a posteriori) in this thread are exceedingly narrow, and so think it better to direct you to the works of others.

quine's two dogmas of empiricism is probably the most widely known paper on the subject, as well as being short and easy to follow, and youd probably find it interesting, even if you disagree, as it deals with this topic directly.

ive taken the "web of definitions" from quine's "web of belief". rorty and putnam are also very relevent figures. such a view is common among anti-foundationalists, fallibilists, verificationists, and especially neopragmatists. and theres many more movements that would seek to deny epistemological binaries in general

[superiorpisspot234]

Good thread

[Altruist]

Insufferable kant